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WHY RICO'S EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH IS PROPERLY
COEXTENSIVE WITH THE REACH OF ITS PREDICATES
Melvin L. Otey*

INTRODUCTION
In certain respects, the world is smaller now than ever before. The growing ease of
communication and travel has begotten routine, instantaneous interaction between
individuals, groups, and entities that were formerly isolated by distance or restricted to
contact via mail and telephones. Advances in computer technology and the Internet, among
other things, have effectively erased the divides and largely obliterated these restrictions.
Individuals are using their cellular telephones to communicate and conduct business of
various kinds with people all over the globe on a daily basis. While these developments have
produced many desirable and beneficial effects, they have also created weighty new risks and
dangers for nation-states and their citizenries.
As globalization flourishes, the challenges for each sovereign in protecting its
nationals correspondingly multiplies,' and this inevitably raises questions about the
extraterritorial application of domestic laws, that is, their enforcement beyond domestic
boundaries. 2 More pointedly, America must increasingly wrestle with the extent to which its
laws apply to conduct directed from the United States into other nations and activities
directed into the United States from other nations. Given this reality, it is significant that the
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Amridge University; M.Div. Amridge University; J.D. Howard University Law School. Trial Attorney, U.S.
Department of Justice, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, 2000-2003. Trial Attorney, U.S.
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author expresses his gratitude for the love and support of his wife, Jania, and his sons, Caleb and Christian, as
well as the aid of his research assistant, Ms. Jennifer Brooke Marshall.
' NAT'L SECURITY STAFF, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: ADDRESSING

CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, 3 (2011) ("In January 2010, the United States Government
completed a comprehensive review of international organized crime the first on this topic since 1995. Based
on the review and subsequent reporting, the Administration has concluded that, in the intervening years,
international
or transnational
organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope, and influence and
that it poses a significant threat to national and international security.").
2 Ryan Walsh, ExtraterritorialConfusion: The Complex Relationship Between Bowman and Morrison and a
Revised Approach to Extraterritoriality, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 627, 632-33 (2013) ("However, expanding
globalism, communications, and technology will inevitably result in multi-jurisdictional conduct, leaving some
nations without redress unless they apply their laws extraterritorially.").
3 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust, 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992) ("In an increasingly international
market, commercial transactions involving players from multiple nations have become commonplace. Every
one of these transactions presents the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in the courts of the nations of the
parties involved concerning any dispute arising in the transaction."); Juan M. Alcala, TransnationalDisputes in
a Global Economy, 75 TEX. B. J. 512, 512 (2012) ("The growth in cross-border disputes is challenging the way
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars across the globe think about and deal with procedural and substantive legal
issues, diverse legal regimes, and cultural differences."); Walsh, supra note 2 at 629 ("The emergence of new
global issues has brought the presumption against extraterritoriality under fire. Crimes are becoming more
intricate and complex, and continual developments call for the United States to alter the way it applies federal
laws extraterritorially."); NAT'L SECURITY STAFF, supra note 1 at 22 ("To address recent TOC trends, the
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extraterritorial reach of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, or "RICO,"
one of America's most powerful statutes, the one perhaps most capable of redressing threats
necessarily concomitant with increased globalization, is being haphazardly and inconsistently
discerned.
Morrison and Kiobel, two recent Supreme Court cases, have radically changed the
way courts approach extraterritorial inquiries in many instances, but their ultimate import on
the question of RICO's extraterritorial reach is far from settled. 4 To put it kindly, "the postMorrison RICO cases have yet to settle on a single approach." If one were to put a sharper
point on it, he or she might fairly conclude that since Morrison, the lower courts have been
"all over the board" producing "the very confusion and variation in standards" the Supreme
Court hoped to remedy by rendering the decision.6 Resolution to the question of RICO's
extraterritorial reach is absolutely vital to American interests in the current transnational and
geopolitical climate.
RICO is an expansive tool, a veritable broad sword promulgated by Congress to
redress dire threats to America's national economy and security. Over the course of more
than four decades, the statute has proven its mettle in protecting these interests, but continued
judicial failures to recognize the full breadth of its extraterritorial reach leaves the nation
more vulnerable to new and emerging threats. 8 This article discusses the significance of the
dilemma and proposes that, until contrary guidance is provided by statutory amendment or a

Administration will work with Congress on a range of legislative solutions to allow or enhance the prosecution
of TOC enterprises and significant TOC activity that affects the United States. We will also enhance our antimoney laundering and forfeiture authorities to target TOC networks that pose threats to national and
international security.").
4 Gideon Mark, RICO's Extraterritoriality,50 AM. Bus. L.J. 543, 594 (2013) ("It is not at all clear how
Morrison 's logic translates to RICO.").
5 Mitsui O.S.K. Lines v. Seamaster Logistics, 871 F. Supp. 2d 933, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see also Anneka
Huntley, RICO's ExtraterritorialityAfter Morrison: Where Should We Go From Here?, 65 HASTINGS L.J.
1691, 1693 (2014) ("Because RICO jurisprudence borrows heavily from securities jurisprudence, and it
borrowed the conduct and effects test in particular, the ruling in Morrison threw courts into turmoil over how to
apply RICO to enterprises and transactions that occur abroad.").
6 Lorrie L. Hargrove et al., The ExtraterritorialDefense: A Border to RICO Claims Arising From International
Transactions,81 DEF. COUNS. J. 47, 49, 52 (2014).
7 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, pt. 1, at 164 (1970) ("The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United
States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; ... (4) organized
crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent
investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign
commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and
(5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law
inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or
remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact."); see also, 18 U.S.C. §
1961 (2012); Doe v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 115 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Congress sought to eradicate the
substantial and detrimental economic consequences that plague the United States as a result of organized crime
activity. Inferentially, Congress also sought to eradicate the effects of such activity on our domestic security.")
(internal citations omitted); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Though its
emphasis is on economic effects, RICO itself is not so limited; it's history demonstrates concern with our
domestic security and welfare as well as our gross national product.").
' Mark, supra note 4, at 545.
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Supreme Court decision squarely addressing the matter, courts should apply RICO
extraterritorially insofar as its underlying predicates in a given case apply extraterritorially.
The discussion will proceed in five parts. The first presents a brief overview of the
RICO statute, highlighting its breadth. Second, is a description of the rise of transnationalism,
which makes the need for proper extraterritorial application of RICO more acute. The third
section discusses Morrison and Kiobel, which ostensibly clarified and refined the judicial
canon of extraterritoriality. The fourth addresses the judiciary's struggles in attempting to
apply Morrison in RICO cases and the merits of identifying the "pattern of racketeering"
rather than the "enterprise" as RICO's focus. The final section presents the bonafides of the
"coextensive with predicate acts" approach to extraterritorial application of RICO as the one
that should be adopted by all courts facing this important issue.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF RICO
RICO's breadth, which is its greatest strength, 9 potentially permits prosecutors and
plaintiffs to include persons filling distinct roles in various components of a complex
transnational enterprise in one case. For example, the planners, financiers, smugglers, and
bombers in a terrorism-related case can be made to stand trial together. Similarly, in a sex
trafficking case, the recruiters, drivers, brothel operators, and enforcers can all be called to
account in a single indictment or complaint. This sort of comprehensive litigation makes it
easier to cast discrete acts in the light of their full criminal and unsavory context. Few, if any,
other federal statutes are so thorough and capacious.
Recognizing that organized crime constituted a dire threat to America's economy
and national security,10 Congress enacted RICO as "an aggressive initiative to supplement old
remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime." 1 Its primary purpose was to protect
organizations from the untoward influence and taint of infiltration by nefarious outsiders and
racketeers. 12 The track record of RICO's utility in this regard is beyond credible dispute.
Federal prosecutors have lauded its efficacy. One called it "an effective weapon against
corrupt public
officials" and "far and away the most effective attack" against systemic
• 13
corruption. Additionally, a former Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section
of the United States Justice Department offered this ringing endorsement: "RICO has proven
to be an extremely important tool assisting in the prevention of organized crime in the United
States.... Currently, it is evident that control of organized crime in the United States would
be inconceivable without RICO. 1 4

9 DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., 672 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2012) (calling RICO's breadth its "very
strength").
10 S. Res. 30, 91st Cong., 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statements of Sen. Yarborough and Sen. Hruska);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
11 Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479,498 (1985).
12 Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993); Aetna Casualty Sur. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546,
1558 (1st Cir. 1994).
13 Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of FederalRICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV.1035, 1040 (1990).
14 Bruce G. Ohr, Effective Methods to Combat TransnationalOrganized Crime in CriminalJustice Processes,
in 58 RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES, 116

T

INT'L TRAINING COURSE VISITING EXPERTS PAPERS 40, 51

(2001).
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RICO's impact is not solely limited to criminal prosecutions. While it is a criminal
statute, it provides civil remedies15 and the courts have noted its impact in civil litigation. For
example, in Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, the First Circuit Court of Appeals described
how formidable the statute's civil provisions can be: "Civil RICO is an unusually potent
weapon the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device. The very pendency of a RICO
suit can be stigmatizing and its consummation can be costly. '1 6 More recently, the Southern
District of New York observed, "Both the potential financial rewards for plaintiffs, and the
stigma that may 1attach to RICO defendants, make the statute a powerful weapon for
aggrieved parties." 7
A. Proscriptions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962
Congress created four offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 to achieve RICO's design as
a supplement to fighting crime. Each involves the use of either a "pattern of racketeering" or a
single collection of unlawful debt (that is, a debt incurred through illegal gambling or
loansharking activity 9) to influence "enterprises" engaged in or affecting interstate commerce
or foreign commerce.2 0 The first three offenses are substantive. 21 First, § 1962(a) makes it
unlawful to acquire, establish, or operate an enterprise with income derived from such a
pattern or collection. 22 This is tantamount to a ban on purchasing an enterprise with filthy
lucre. Second, § 1962(b) renders culpable those who acquire or maintain an interest in an
enterprise through either a pattern of racketeering or collection of unlawful debt 3 The third
substantive proscription, § 1962(c), prohibits persons employed by or associated with an
enterprise from conducting or participating in its affairs via the aforementioned pattern or
collection.24
The fourth and final provision, § 1962(d), criminalizes any conspiracy to violate one
of the three substantive provisions . Because RICO conspiracy does not require proof of an
overt act, it is broader than traditional conspiracy provisions, including the general federal
conspiracy statute. 26 Any individual who merely agrees to commit a substantive violation is
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2012).
16 Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991).
17 DLJ Mortg. Capital v. Kontogiannis, 726 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).

" United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 24 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 645
(lIth Cir. 1984).
19 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(B) (2012); see, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1989)
(affirming dismissal of a claim alleging violation of §1962(a)).
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
21

See id. at § 1962(a)-(c).

22

See id. at § 1962(a).

23

See id. at § 1962(b).

24

See id. at § 1962(c); United States v. Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956, 966 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852

(1988); United States v. Vastola, 899 F.2d 211,228-29 (3d Cir. 1990).
25 See § 1962(d).
26

See id. at § 371; Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) ("There is no requirement of some overt act

or specific act in the statute before us, unlike the general conspiracy provision applicable to federal crimes,
which requires that at least one of the conspirators have committed an 'act to effect the object of the
conspiracy,' § 371. The RICO conspiracy provision, then, is even more comprehensive than the
general conspiracy offense in § 371."); United States v. Harris, 695 F.3d 1125, 1133 (10th Cir. 2012) ("Further,
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culpable under this section. This sweeping provision was designed, in part, "to relieve some
of the deficiencies of the traditional conspiracy prosecution as a means for coping with
contemporary organized crime. 28
B. RICO's Penalties and Remedies
RICO is a powerful, broad criminal statute that provides both severe criminal
penalties and potentially onerous civil remedies in order to accomplish its goals. 9 Criminally,
offenders can be imprisoned for up to twenty years or up to life if the underlying racketeering
activity is punishable by life imprisonment. Further, criminal offenders can be compelled to
forfeit any interests acquired or used in violation of § 1962.30
Civilly, violators may be subject to treble damages and attorney's fees to prevailing
private parties. Additionally, these offenders may be susceptible to equitable relief including
divestiture, dissolution, or reorganization in suits initiated by the government. 32 These
remedies are essential tools in combating the threats Congress perceived when passing the
RICO legislation. 3 In fact, the Supreme Court has specially noted that the civil penalties
could be "useful in eradicating organized crime from the social fabric" by purging corrupt
associations of their ill-gotten gains. 34 Overall, RICO is a heavy, two-headed hammer
designed for combat on both criminal and civil fronts, and its punitive features potentially
increase its utility in combating extraterritorial threats.

§ 1962(d) requires no overt act, unlike the general criminal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, which does");

United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1230 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the government is not required to
prove the defendant committed an overt act in order to prove a RICO conspiracy violation); Hecht v.
Commerce Clearing House, 897 F.2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Therefore, although an overt act by itself (whether
or not injury ensues) is not a requisite element of a section 1962(d) criminal conspiracy violation, see United
States v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 1986), we hold that injury from an overt act is necessary and
sufficient to establish civil standing for a RICO conspiracy violation.").
27 Salinas, 522 U.S. at 64 (noting that the RICO conspiracy statute does not require the Government to prove
each conspirator agreed to personally commit two predicate acts).
21 United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1981).
29

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 496 (2000); Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 479 (2006)

(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (2012); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2000) ("We find that the
'shall forfeit' language of the statute mandates that a district court assess forfeiture against the defendant when
the facts support a finding of a sufficient nexus between the property to be forfeited and the RICO violation").
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
32 See id.; United States v. Philip Morris USA, 566 F.3d 1095, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Private
parties, on the

other hand, may seek relief under section 1964(c), which allows suits for damages. The statutory scheme does
not directly provide private parties with a cause of action for equitable remedies"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Taken together, the legislative history and statutory
language suggest overwhelmingly that no private equitable action should be implied under civil RICO").
33 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("But the principal value of this legislation may well
be found to exist in its civil provisions which employ the time-tested antitrust remedies of injunction,
divestiture, dissolution and reorganization which have been highly effective in removing and preventing
harmful behavior in the field of trade and commerce"); Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (observing
that the statute's remedial purposes are most evident in the provision of a private action for injured persons).
34 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981).
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C. Elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
RICO's most frequently charged and litigated substantive provision (and the basis
for most alleged RICO conspiracies) is § 1962(c), which makes it "unlawful for any person
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt.",3 5 An introduction to the core components of this sub-section, then, is warranted
because its unique features are key both to understanding the difficulties courts have
experienced post-Morrison in determining its extraterritorial application and in settling on the
proper approach.
1.

RICO's "Enterprise"

The RICO "enterprise," a required element of any RICO charge or claim, 3 6 is
sufficiently expansive to encompass transnational businesses and criminal groups that
potentially threaten America's security and economic interests. While some have sought to
restrict the concept to stereotypical mobsters portrayed in movies like The Godfather and
television series like The Sopranos, it is not so narrow. Because the statute contains no
limiting language and Congress called for liberal construction to achieve its remedial
purposes, courts generally agree the RICO "enterprise" is far broader than that.3 8
The statutory definition of enterprise includes legal entities, groups of individuals,
and groups composed of individuals and entities that are factually, if not legally, associated. 9
This encompasses, inter alia, corporations, 40 branches and offices of government, 41 fire

15

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).

36 United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 557 (7th Cir. 2012).
37 Chevron v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 553 F.

Supp. 1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Indeed, Congress rejected an amendment to RICO designed to explicitly
define organized crime because a 'bright line' legislative definition might unconstitutionally create a status

offense and because it would be easy for organized criminals to alter their conduct so that they would fall
outside of the reach of the statute.").
3' Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944 (2009) ("The statute does not specifically define the outer
boundaries of the 'enterprise' ...");
see Sedima, 473 U.S. 497 ("RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson
not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, but also of its express
admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."); see also Hosseini, 679
F.3d 557 ("[tlhe Supreme Court reads this definition ['enterprise'] quite broadly"); see generally United States
v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the RICO statute states "'enterprise' includes" as

opposed to "'enterprise' means").
39 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012); United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that

"agroup or union consisting solely of corporations or other legal entities can constitute an 'associated in fact'
enterprise.").

41 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987); United

States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440 (2d Cir. 1974) (foreign corporation can constitute a RICO enterprise), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).

See, e.g., United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985) ("A state or local government office
or organization may properly be charged as a RICO enterprise."); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993
(6th Cir. 1982) ("In drafting this statute, Congress chose language which was both clear and broad. Nothing in
the statutory language employed by Congress prohibited the United States Attorney from drafting this
41
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departments 42 and labor unions, 43 all of which may have been created by charter or statute for
44
legitimate
terrorist
45 purposes, as well as diabolical
46 associations like La Cosa Nostra,
groups, drug trafficking organizations,
and violent gangs. 47 As the Supreme Court
explained, "Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises. The
former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its
consequences."48
Even less formal groups, including those with comparatively loose organizations
lacking established hierarchies and shared long-term goals, can potentially qualify if they
have a shared purpose, relationships among the associates, and longevity sufficient for the
associates to pursue their shared purpose. 49 No economic motive is required.50 Nor are fixed

indictment so as to describe 'The Office of Governor of Tennessee' as the 'enterprise' here involved."); United
States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 1993) ("the Office of Judge of the 7th Judicial Circuit"); United
States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 137-38 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985) (Cook County
Circuit Court); United States v. Shamah, 624 F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 2010) (Chicago Police Department enterprise);
United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849 (Boston Police Department
enterprise).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1290 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The Chicago Fire
Department is a
legitimate governmental entity possessing a clear organizational structure, thus qualifying as an 'enterprise'
under RICO.").
43 See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1992); see generally United States v. Robilotto,
828 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1987).
44 See, e.g., United States v. Pizzonia, 577 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2009) (Gambino organized crime family of La
Cosa Nostra).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (denying motion to
dismiss RICO conspiracy charge against alleged members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction);
United States v. Marzook, 426 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (denying motion to dismiss RICO
conspiracy count against alleged member of Hamas).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Praddy, 725 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2013) (Raleigh Place Crew marijuana
trafficking
group).
47 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (Barrio
Aztecas); United States v. Olson, 450 F.3d 655, 668 (7th Cir. 2006) (Almighty Latin Kings Nation); United
States v. Martinez, 657 F.3d 811,815 (9th Cir. 2011) (Mexican Mafia).
41 Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981) ("In view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute,
we are unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow aspects of
organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of legitimate business."); Anza v. Ideal
Steel Supply, 547 U.S. 451, 479 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("RICO
essentially seeks to prevent organized criminals from taking over or operating legitimate businesses. Its
language, however, extends its scope well beyond those central purposes."); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d
104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) ("These new penal prohibitions, enhanced
sanctions, and new remedies clearly extend to an illegitimate business as well as a legitimate one; to read the
Act otherwise does not make sense since it leaves a loophole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage").
49 Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 941, 946 (2009); see, e.g., United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257,
270-71 (3rd Cir. 2011) (citing Boyle and reversing district court's dismissal of a RICO defendant charging
members and associates of an enterprise comprised of five individuals and four corporations); Jay E. Hayden
Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, 610 F.3d 382, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging post-Boyle viability of an
association-in-fact consisting of a bank, two law firms, and seven persons connected with either the bank or the
law firms); United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming convictions where
defendant were part of "an informal consortium of a law firm and two police departments with the three
individuals").
50 Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257-59 (1994).
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roles, regular meetings, or established rules. 5 1 At its core, an enterprise is merely "a group of
52
persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct."
Most groups presenting a transnational threat to America's economic or national security
would obviously qualify.
2.

Engaged in or Affecting Interstate or Foreign Commerce

The conduct proscribed under RICO is only actionable if the alleged enterprise
engaged in or affected interstate or foreign commerce. Only a de minimis effect is required
to satisfy this jurisdictional element 54 and the conduct of the enterprise, rather than the
individual defendant(s) or specific racketeering activity, must be considered. For example, a
drug trafficking organization in one state, that obtains narcotics from another state, would be
sufficient to satisfy the de minimis effect requirement. 6 A group of individuals making
intrastate sales of contraband alcohol manufactured out of state would suffice as well. 57 So,
too, would either a bookmaking operation that utilizes supplies originating out of state or a
prosecutor's office that regularly places interstate calls; purchases and uses out of state
supplies; and utilizes workers or contractors from other states. 5 8Any group or entity capable
of having a transnational impact will almost necessarily have the requisite effect on
commerce.
3.

Conduct or Participatein the Affairs of an Enterprise

Section 1962(c) is different than RICO's other substantive provisions in that it
emphasizes the operation rather than the acquisition of the enterprise. It criminalizes
employees and associates conducting of participating, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering or collection of an unlawful debt.
This basically makes it unlawful to operate an enterprise in an unscrupulous, illegal manner.

5 Boyle, 556 U.S. at 941, 948.
52 Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
53 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
54 See id.; United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 373 (6th Cir. 2002) ("For purposes of a conviction under 18
962

U.S.C. §§ 1
(c) & (d), the government need only prove that the enterprise's racketeering activities had a de
minimis connection with interstate commerce") (emphasis added); United States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 984
(9th Cir. 2003) ("The district court, therefore, correctly instructed the jury that a de minimis affect on interstate
commerce was sufficient to establish jurisdiction under RICO.") (emphasis added).
55 Allen v. United States, 45 F. App'x 402, 405 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Moreover, only the criminal enterprise itself
or the racketeering activities of those associated with the enterprise, not the conduct of each individual
defendant, must affect interstate commerce."); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105, 1116 (6th Cir. 1985) ("It
is not the conduct of each individual defendant that must affect interstate commerce, rather the criminal
enterprise itself."); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 357 n.38 (3d Cir. 1989) ("It should be noted that 'only the
criminal enterprise must affect interstate commerce -- not the conduct of each individual defendant."')
(quoting United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781 n.4 (6th Cir. 1985)).
56 United States v. White, 582 F.3d 787, 803 (7th Cir. 2009).
57 United States v. Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cit. 1985).
51 United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1980).
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol14/iss1/2

8

Otey: Why RICO's Extraterritorial Reach is Properly Coextensive with th

RICO's EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH

Significantly, culpability is not limited only to upper level management; supervisory
authority and power to make command decisions are not necessary. 60 All who participate in
an enterprise's operation or management potentially come within the statute's purview, 61 and
lower level participants under the direction of upper management as well as associates who
exert control over the enterprise are part of the class of persons that "conduct" and
"participate" in its affairs. 62 Indeed, "the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest
fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. 63 Because there is no geographical
limitation for those who conduct and participate in an enterprise's affairs, this net is certainly
broad enough to encompass culpable actors situated outside of America's shores.
4.

RICO's "Patternof Racketeering"

As the Supreme Court observed, RICO's "key requirement" is the "pattern of
racketeering. 64 This pattern, which the Court has called "the heart" of an alleged violation,
is a combination of two or more acts or threats (the last of which occurred within ten years
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering), enumerated or incorporated by reference
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 66 The categories of conduct, generally characteristic of organized
crime activity,6 include felonious acts or threats "involving" (interpreted by the courts to
include attempts, conspiracies and solicitations as well as completed offenses) 68 murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, and drug
trafficking chargeable under state law.69 They also include a myriad of offenses indictable
under federal statutes roughly analogous to state offenses of the aforementioned ilk, in
addition to financial, immigration, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism-related crimes, all of
which are prototypical threats attending increased transnationalism.
The definition of a pattern of racketeering provided in the RICO statute itself only
provides minimal parameters for its existence; it is a broad "outer limit" for a concept
encompassing more than a collection of enumerated acts. Indeed, the language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(5) assumes the concept involves more,2 and the legislative history demonstrates that

60 United States v. Shamah, 624 F.3d 449, 454-55 (7th Cir. 2010).
61 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993).
62

id.

63

United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903 (5th Cir. 1978).

64

H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989).

65 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc.'s., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012).
67 116 CONG. REC. 601, 18940 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
61

See United States v. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986)

(reaffirming that "a conspiracy to commit an offense listed in § 1961(1)(A) may serve as a predicate act
required to establish a violation of § 1962(c)"); United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1044-46 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984) ("Conspiracy is an 'an act ... involving murder" under state law);
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1134-35 (3d Cir. 1990) (observing that § 1961(1)(A) encompasses

predicate attempts and conspiracies).
69

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2012).

71 See id. at § 1961(1)(B)-(G).
7 H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1989).
72 Id.
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Congress did not intend for isolated acts of racketeering to constitute
The
• • ,,74a "pattern."
amalgamation of predicate acts must have "continuity plus relationship.
Continuity refers
either to a closed period of repeated conduct or to past conduct that projects into the future
with a threat of repetition; while relationship refers either to the connection the predicate
acts bear to one another
or to some "external organizing principle that renders the acts
76
'ordered' or 'arranged.'
The expansive scope of RICO's "pattern of racketeering" makes the statute a robust
weapon for both prosecutors and plaintiffs. It allows for the presentation of what might
otherwise seem (outside of the RICO context) to be isolated incidents of criminality and
permits a thorough confrontation of societal threats rather than a series of disjointed,
duplicative, and costly investigations and prosecutions of discrete events. This is precisely the
kind of sweeping tool that is needed to combat complex transnational dangers.
D. Venue for 18 U.S.C. § 1962
Because the expansive list of potential predicate offenses incorporates some state
law violations, both state and federal law enforcement agencies can jointly investigate
individuals and groups who might be attempting to improperly acquire, influence, or operate
enterprises affecting interstate and foreign commerce and charge them in a single federal
prosecution in which the true scope of their conduct can be properly presented. For example,
in police corruption cases, it is "possible to join in one case seemingly independent shakedowns by various defendants if the proof establishes that the defendants acted in concert by
first creating and then capitalizing on a city-wide atmosphere of fear.",77 This centralization of
enforcement efforts potentially allows prosecutors, and plaintiffs in civil proceedings, to paint
the most comprehensive picture of defendants' culpability and the nature of the corresponding
threat while also conserving valuable public resources.

7S See Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14 (1985); H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 238 (noting that the principal

sponsor of the Senate bill "expressly indicated that 'proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more,
does not establish a pattern').
74 See generally 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (statements of Sen. Hruska and Sen. Yarborough); Marshall &
Ilsley Trust v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1987) ("This circuit has established that the existence of a
'pattern' as required by RICO is a fact-specific question encompassing many relevant factors. The racketeering
activities involved must reveal some 'continuity' -- i.e., activities continuing over time or in different places -as well as some 'relationship' among activities -- i.e., activities adding up to coordinated action") (internal
citations omitted); H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 230 ("RICO's legislative history [reveals Congress' intent] that to
prove a 'pattern of racketeering' activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show [] that the racketeering predicates
are related, and that they [amount to] or [pose a threat of continued] criminal activity."); Vild v. Visconsi, 956
F.2d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992) ("Continuity and relationship constitute two
analytically distinct prongs of the pattern requirement."); see also United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 992
(9th Cir. 2011).
75 H.].Inc., 492 U.S. at 241; see, e.g., United States v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2006) ("Even if the
predicate acts had not extended over a period of at least one year, there was also a sufficient threat of repetition
in connection to the DTF scheme to show open ended continuity."); Schreiber Distributing v. Serv-Well
Furniture, 806 F.2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that in order to establish a pattern, there must be a
threat of continuing activity, and that alleged acts of mail and wire fraud that led to only one shipment of goods
did not meet the requirement of a pattern of racketeering activity).
76 H.].Inc., 492 U.S. at 238.
77 Coffey, supra note 13, at 1041.
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Furthermore, the "pattern" requirement, which necessitates multiple acts over a
period of time, makes RICO a continuing offense. 7 8 This allows the predicates to be litigated
and tried in any district in which they began, continued, or were concluded. 79 Further, it is not
necessary for defendants to complete a racketeering act within the district of indictment. 80
Consequently, in addition to allowing prosecutors and plaintiffs to more comprehensively and
efficiently redress disparate types of related conduct, the statute potentially enables them to
allege counts, claims and acts that occurred in multiple venues, potentially even international
venues, so long as they pertain to a single enterprise. 81
II. RISING TRANSNATIONALISM
RICO's unique breadth and power, and the proper extraterritorial application of its
breadth and power, are particularly germane to American interests in light of the world's
increasing transnationalism. While general knowledge of advances in globalization and
multinational economic interdependence might properly be presumed, the significance of this
rising tide to the present inquiry cannot be. A brief consideration of this shift and its
manifestations in America's courts, then, is warranted because they undergird both the
urgency for a clear, well-reasoned settlement of the question of RICO's extraterritorial
application and the proper evaluation of any proposed solution. At the outset, it is important
to note that both transnational business and transnational crime potentially fall within the
statute's impressive span.
A. The Proliferation of Transnational Business
The evidence of America's growing economic interdependence is readily apparent.
Global banks are developing networks of physical branches and subsidiaries in foreign
countries, 82 and their operations in the United States provide important benefits to the national
economy. 83 Similarly, transnational auto companies have become as much a part of the
American economy as domestic manufacturers. 84 Honda, for instance, has major facilities in
71United

States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1366 (2d

Cir. 1994); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 754 (3d Cir. 1991), cert denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991);
United States v. Machado-Erazo, 986 F. Supp. 2d 39, 55 (D.D.C. 2013).
79See

18 U.S.C. §3237(a) (2012); United States v.Giovanelli, 747 F. Supp. 875, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1989);

see also Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 61 (1989) (stating that under state RICO statute
patterned after federal RICO statute, a requirement that all predicate acts be committed in the jurisdiction where

prosecution is brought "would essentially turn the RICO statute on its head: barring RICO prosecutions of large
national enterprises that commit single predicate offenses in numerous jurisdictions.").
" See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (2012); United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 896 (2d Cir. 2008) ("In a conspiracy

prosecution, venue is proper in any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was
committed.") (internal citations omitted).
" See, e.g., United States v. Marzook, 426 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826 (N.D. Ill. 2006); United States v. Al-Arian,
308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
12 Nicola Cetorelli & Linda S. Goldberg, Banking Globalization and Monetary Transmission, 67 J.
FIN. 1811,
1811 (2012).
13

Kathleen A. Scott, Non-US. Banks Operating in the United States The FederalReserve as Gatekeeper, 27

J.TAx'N & REG.FIN. INST'N 37, 37 (2014).
14

Jerry Harris, The World Economic Crisis and TransnationalCorporations,74 SC. SoC'Y 394, 396 (2010).
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thirty-one cities within sixteen states, while Toyota spends 30 billion dollars annually with
American suppliers. 85 Of course, American auto companies have also assumed an
increasingly transnational character; General Motors makes more than three-quarters of its
sales abroad, with China and Brazil being its two largest foreign markets. 86 "Business
relationships are crossing national borders in a complex web, 8 and courts are taking note.88
This expansion of transnational dealings undeniably impacts American society
culturally, politically, and economically, but it also affects the nation in a plethora of ways
legally.89 American jurisprudence is invariably implicated because one natural byproduct of
transnational commerce is transnational conflict. International business begets international
disagreements and disputes, some of which can be resolved through various alternative
dispute resolution procedures, including arbitration. 90 Other conflicts, however, spawn civil
litigation where parties allege causes of action predicated on the conduct of foreign actors in
foreign places, 91 and these international business transactions are particularly vulnerable to
RICO litigation, 92 at least partly because many civil RICO claims rest upon alleged mail or
wire fraud activity.93

85

id.

16 Id. at 399.
17 Alcala, supra note 3.
" See generally M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, 407 U.S. 1, 8, 15 (1972); F. Hoffmann-La Roche v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th
Cir. 1992); Kaepa Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1996) (Garza, J.,
dissenting) (noting that
the world is increasingly economically interdependent); Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 88 (2d
Cir. 1997) (Alitmari, J., dissenting) ("The burgeoning global business community fosters economic
interdependence and the United States cannot act without regarding to the concerns of the rest of the world.").
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE, 729-30
(Thomson Reuters 6th ed. 2012).
90 Alcala, supra note 3 ("The number and breadth of cross-border disputes has grown as the economy has
'9 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,

increasingly become more global. For instance, the number of international arbitrations has increased
dramatically in the past 20 years."); Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal ContractLaw and
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1541 (2006).
9' FRANK B. CROSS

& ROGER

LEROY MILLER,

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

OF

BUSINESS: ETHICAL,

REGULATORY, GLOBAL, AND CORPORATE ISSUES 173 (8th ed. 2012) ("The international application of tort

liability is growing in significance and controversy. An increasing number of U.S. plaintiffs are suing foreign
(or U.S.) entities for tortsthat these entities have allegedly committed overseas."); see, e.g., Liquidation
Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008) (civil RICO
case involving claims that a Florida businessman helped insiders of a large bank in the Dominican Republic
wrongfully divert millions of dollars); Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 2001)
(involving a Mexican national applying in Mexico for work in the United States with an American
corporation); see also Ohr, supra note 14, at 40 ("[T]he growth of international commerce and the staggering
number of international banking transactions performed every day by major banks provide vital benefits to the
world's economies, but they also present ample opportunity for fraud and theft and allow international money
launderers to easily hide their ill-gotten gains.").
92 Hargrove et al., supra note 6 at 47-48.
9' Cf. Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) ("The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put

appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire,
mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
'pattern."'); Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The widespread abuse of
civil RICO stems from the fact that all modern business transactions entail use of the mails or wires giving
plaintiffs a jurisdictional hook and the fact that RICO offers a far more generous compensation scheme than
typically available in state court."); Meier v. Musburger, 588 F. Supp. 2d 883, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("Given the
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B. Proliferation of Transnational Crime
Otherwise legitimate international commerce can also result in criminal charges
because, among other things, transnational competition leads to many of the same corruption
problems that attend domestic business dealings. 94 It is more disconcerting though, that
advances in technology, travel, and communication, along with the accompanying shifts in
geopolitical relations, have allowed wholly illegitimate businesses to metastasize along with
their typically more honorable counterparts.9 Beginning in the 1970s, when the RICO statute
went into effect, and accelerating in the 1990s, crime groups have taken on an increasingly
transnational character. 96 As the District Court for the District of Columbia explained,
Many modern criminal organizations have an international infrastructure, and the
crimes (as well as their effects) transcend national borders. Activities traditionally associated
with organized crime, such as wire fraud and money laundering, may originate from a

breadth of the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, mailings and wirings have always been
favored predicate acts in cases like this where ordinary disputes are sought to be transformed into RICO
claims.").
94 See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F. 3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) (involving an indictment alleging that
defendants orchestrated the bribing of Haitian customs officials to significantly reduce customs duties and sales
taxes for a Houston-based company in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Chevron v. Donziger,
974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (involving a five-year effort to extort and defraud Chevron through the
series of RICO predicate acts that included emails and money transfers between the United States and Ecuador
as well as bribery of an Ecuadorian judge and court-appointed expert); United States v. Norris, 719 F. Supp. 2d
557, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2010) ("This case arises from a grand jury investigation of an international conspiracy to fix
the price of certain electrical and mechanical carbon products that were sold in the United States and elsewhere
..

.).

95 John T. Picarelli, Responding to Transnational Organized Crime Supporting Research, Improving
Practice, 268 NAT. INST. JUST. J.4, 6 (2011); Jay S. Albanese, Deciphering the Linkages Between Organized
Crime and TransnationalCrime, 66 INT'L AFT. J. 1, 3 (2012) ("These "new" forms of transnational crimes have
been made possible by changes in technology and communication, ease of travel, and political unrest all
consequences of globalization and government prohibitions."); James Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep't of
Justice, Speaks at High Level Hemispheric Meeting Against Transnational Organized Crime (March 1, 2012) in
2012 WL 9246465 (D.O.J.) ("some countries undergoing the transition from authoritarian rule often serve as
fertile breeding grounds for organized crime. These countries face serious organized crime challenges that will
stifle not only their own economic development, but will also have global implications in our increasingly
interconnected world."); Ohr, supra note 14 at 40 ("One of the most serious unintended consequences of the
globalization that we have been experiencing for the last few years has been the rapid rise of transnational
organized crime groups."); see, e.g., Davis Int'l v. New Start Grp., 488 F.3d 597, 600-01 (3d Cir. 2007)
(affirming in part and reversing in part a District Court's dismissal of a complaint alleging a decades long fraud
perpetrated by members of an international organized group of Russian and American racketeers that was
carried out in the United States and Russia and involving, inter alia, check-kiting fraud on the Russian central
bank that procured the funds in the United States that became the seed money for criminal ventures, including
the seizure of a Russian company).
96 Picarelli, supra note 95; Albanese, supra note 95 at 1 ("Transnational organized crime has characterized the
last twenty years, beginning with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of vulnerable emerging
democracies around the world"); see, e.g., United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2010) ("La Mara
Salvatrucha, otherwise known as MS-13, is one of the largest and most violent street gangs in the United States.
The gang originated in Los Angeles, California in the 1980s. Since then, it has spread across the country and
into foreign countries such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico"); United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 20304 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that the government introduced evidence at trial that Mexican MS-13 cliques act as
smugglers; MS-13 is engaged in international narcotics smuggling; and MS-13 members in New York sent
money to El Salvador to help members who had been deported from the United States).
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different continent than the ultimate place of impact of the crime, and intermediate actors may
be located in yet a third place.9
The current world climate offers criminal organizations new avenues and a wider
berth to ply their odious trades, which enables them to simultaneously operate in disparate
and diverse countries in ways they never could before. 98 For example, "as financial
transactions have migrated from cash to checks and other negotiable instruments, and today to
electronic transfers, so too have criminals."99 Similarly, crooks are taking advantage of the
prominence and anonymity of the Internet through global fraud via sites like eBay, 00 and
through cheap, instantaneous global distribution of child pornography.101 In certain respects,
then, technological advances, which have been a great blessing in some ways, have been a
lamentable curse in others.10 2 These and other negative, dangerous appendages to the world's

Doe v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 115 (D.D.C. 2005); see also Ohr, supra note 14 at 40 ("We, and
our colleagues in other countries, have therefore been caught unprepared by the sudden rise in transnational
organized crime activities. We are not used to criminals who might reside in country A and travel to country B
in order to commit a crime that takes place in countries C, D and E.").
17

" NAT'L

SECURITY STAFF, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: ADDRESSING

CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY at THE WHITE HOUSE (2011) ("During the past 15 years,

technological innovation and globalization have proven to be an overwhelming force for good. However,
transnational criminal organizations have taken advantage of our increasingly interconnected world to expand
their illicit enterprises."); Cole, supra note 95 in 2012 WL 9246465(D.O.J.) ("Our review found that alliances
between organized criminals and oligarchs from the former Soviet Union threaten U.S. businesses and domestic
markets."); see, e.g., United States v. Coffman, Crim. Action No. 09-181-KKC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22766,
at *9 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 7, 2011) (discussing an investigation the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions
where defendant and others were suspected of operating an oil and gas investment scheme using a boiler room
call center in Canada with ties to the Russian mafia); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 79 (2d Cir. 2003)
(involving a conspiracy hatched in the Philippines to attack twelve American aircraft that served routes in
Southeast Asia that resulted in the death of a Japanese national); Press Release, FBI, Manhattan U.S. Attorney
and FBI Assistant Dir. in Charge Announce 24 Arrests in Eight Countries as Part of Int'l Cyber Crime
Takedown (Jun. 26, 2012) (involving more than 400,000 potential cyber crime victims and $205 million in
losses).
99 Salvatore Scanio & Robert W. Ludwig, Surging, Swift And Liable? Cybercrime and Electronic Payments
FraudInvolving CommercialBank Accounts: Who Bears The Loss? 16 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2013).
l00 Michael Levi, States, Frauds, and the Threat of TransnationalOrganized Crime, 66 J. INT'L AFF. 39, 43
(2012); CROSS, supra note 91, at 157 ("The nature of the Internet, however, makes it nearly impossible to
completely block fraudulent auction activity. Because users can assume multiple identities, it is very difficult to
pinpoint fraudulent sellers they will simply change their screen names with each auction."); cf United States
v. Home, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The people who buy and sell through eBay are scattered
around the world -- indeed most of the vehicle sales made through eBay are interstate or international."); see,
e.g., United States v. Funiestas, 2006 CCA LEXIS 296 (N.M.C.C.A. Nov. 30, 2006) ("The appellant then sold
the military property on eBay, an internet-based sales company, to domestic and international purchasers.");
Current Developments: Online Auctions, 28 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER, no. 5, May 2011, at 22-23
(discussing guilty plea of Romanian citizen who "acted as a 'money mule' in a complex Internet fraud
conspiracy" with co-conspirators in Romania who created fraudulent online auctions for expensive items on
sites like eBay, Craigslist, and AutoTrader.com); Wilfredo A. Ferrer, Twenty-One Individuals Charged in the
United States for Alleged Roles in InternationalInternet FraudScheme, CASES & TAKEDOWNS (Jun. 27, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing room/cc/mca fls.html.
101 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
THREAT ASSESSMENT, at 31, U.N. Sales No. E. 10.IV.6 (2010).
102 Id. at vi ("With regard to cybercrime, the Internet has allowed traditional acquisitive crime, such as identity
theft, and transnational trafficking, such as the trade in child pornography, to vastly increase in scope"); Cole,
supra note 95, in 2012 WL 9246465 ("The advance of globalization and the internet, while hugely beneficial to
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technological evolution can potentially3 compromise America's financial and economic
stability as well as its national security.1
Transnational rogues markedly complicate the work of domestic law enforcement
agencies because they expand their profit margins, increase the complexity of their crimes,
and decrease their risks by operating in multiple nation-states. 14 The international movement
of their illicit proceeds is illustrative. Funds derived from the commission of crimes in foreign
countries are sometimes clandestinely funneled to the United States, mixed with legitimate
income or invested in domestic enterprises, and subsequently used in the United States and
abroad.1 0 5 By obfuscating "dirty" money with "clean" money, criminals make their ill-gotten

people everywhere, has also created unparalleled opportunities for criminals to expand their operations and use
the facilities of global communication and commerce to carry out their criminal activities across national
borders."); CROSS, supra note 91, at 157 ("In cyberspace, thieves are not subject to the physical limitations of
the 'real' world. A thief can steal data stored in a networked computer with Internet access from anywhere on
the globe. Only the speed of the connection and the thief s computer equipment limit the quantity of data that
can be stolen."); NAT'L SECURITY STAFF, supra note 1, at 8("Computers and the Internet play a role in most
transnational crimes today, either as the target or the weapon used in the crime."); Ohr, supra note 14, at 40
("The internet allows the individual to access information, do business with and communicate instantly with
persons in every nation, but at the same time it allows criminals to perpetrate confidence schemes and stock
market manipulations, run illegal gambling operations and peddle child pornography across the globe.").
103 Cole, supra note 95, in 2012 WL 9246465 ("The U.S. Secret Service estimates that criminals using
anonymous web sites to buy and sell stolen identities have caused billions of dollars in losses to the United
States' financial infrastructure. Some estimates indicate that online frauds perpetrated by Central European
cybercrime networks alone have defrauded U.S. citizens or entities of approximately $1 billion in a single
year."); NAT'L SECURITY STAFF, supra note 1, at 7-8 ( "some estimates indicate that online frauds
perpetrated by Central European cybercrime networks have defrauded U.S. citizens or entities of approximately
$1 billion in a single year" and "[p]ervasive criminal activity in cyberspace not only directly affects its victims,
but can imperil citizens' and businesses' faith in these digital systems, which are critical to our society and
economy."); see also OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: CYBERCRIME (2005),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty tp&tid 41 ("Cybercrime is one of the greatest threats facing our
country, and has enormous implications for our national security, economic prosperity, and public safety.
Attorney General Eric Holder has made it one of the Department of Justice's top priorities. The range of threats
and the challenges they present for law enforcement expand just as rapidly as technology evolves."); see, e.g.,
Press Release, United States Attorneys Office, EDNY, Malaysian National Sentenced To 10 Years For Hacking
Into
Federal
Reserve
Bank
(Nov.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nye/pr/2011/2011novO4.html; Press Release, FBI, FS-ISAC & IC3, Fraud Alert Cyber Criminal
Targeting Financial Employee Credentials to Conduct Wire Transfer Fraud (Sept. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinanciallnstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf ("Recent FBI
reporting indicates a new trend in which cyber criminal actors are using spare and phishing e-mails, keystroke
loggers, and Remote Access Trojans (RAT) to compromise financial institution networks and obtain employee
login credentials. The stolen credentials were used to initiate unauthorized wire transfers overseas.").
'04 Phil Williams, TransnationalCriminalNetworks, in NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR,
CRIME, AND MILITANCY 61, 78 (John Arquilla et al. eds., 2001); U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note

101, at 29 ("But the process of globalization has outpaced the growth of mechanisms for global governance,
and this deficiency has produced just the sort of regulation vacuum in which transnational organized crime can
thrive."); see, e.g., FBI, supra note 98.
'o' See, e.g., United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1995) (involving a money laundering operation in
which defendants received narcotics trafficking proceeds in New York in cash and wired over $136 million to
foreign bank accounts, primarily in Colombia, over a period of less than two years); UPDATE 2-Western Union
to
Pay
$94
Mln
in
Laundering Probe,
REUTERS
(Feb.
11,
2010,
5:14
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/11 /westernunion-moneylaundering-idUSN1119905220100211
("Western Union Co (WU.N) has agreed to pay $94 million to resolve a decade-long probe into alleged illegal
money laundering into Mexico involving the company's money transfers.").
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gains more difficult to detect, seize, and forfeit. 106 According to the State Department's
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,"
Money laundering continues to be a serious global threat. Jurisdictions flooded with
illicit funds are vulnerable to the breakdown of the rule of law, the corruption of public
officials, and destabilization of their economies. The development of new technologies and
the possibility of linkages among illegal activities that generate considerable proceeds,
transnational criminal organizations, and the funding of terrorist groups only exacerbate the
challenges faced by the financial, law enforcement, supervisory, legal, and intelligence
communities. 107
The deleterious effects of such activity must not be underestimated. It fosters a
world climate of crime in which national borders make people, including Americans, more
rather than less vulnerable.108 James Cole, former Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, poignantly crystallized the gravity of the threat attending the rapid increase of
transnational organized crime activity:
What are the results of these disturbing trends and new patterns of crime? In short,
our review concluded that transnational organized crime has risen to the level of a national
security threat. Countries in key regions around the world are finding their governments
penetrated, weakened and even taken over by organized crime, undermining their democratic
institutions and prospects for economic growth. Economies, including critical markets and the
world financial system are being subverted, exploited and distorted by organized criminals
through corruption and violence, making it harder for legitimate businesses to compete in
those markets and harder for those economies to develop and provide jobs for the law abiding
citizens. Terrorists and insurgents are increasingly turning to organized crime to generate
funding and acquire logistical support to carry out their violent acts. Cybercrime threatens
sensitive government and corporate computer networks, undermines confidence in the
international financial system, and costs consumers billions of dollars annually. And despite
our many successes, illicit drugs remain a serious threat to the health, safety, security and
financial well-being of our citizens. 109
Criminal enterprises are growing more dangerous as they become more versatile,
flexible, and diverse, 110 so prudence demands thorough deployment of America's laws,
including the RICO statute, to protect its citizens from these transnational dangers.

106

AVI JORISCH, TAINTED MONEY: ARE WE LOSING THE WAR ON MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM

FINANCING? 9-10 (2009).
117 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT VOLUME II: MONEY LAUNDERING AND

FINANCIAL CRIMES 3 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222880.pdf.
I0hr,
supra note 14, at 46 ("The transnational aspects of Eurasian Organized Crime, as practiced by the
larger criminal groups, pose a particularly acute threat to the societies of the West. Our law enforcement bodies
face great difficulties in attempting to investigate large scale financial fraud and money laundering schemes
emanating from the former Soviet Union. Often the only part of the crime taking place within western
jurisdictions is the movement of millions, or even billions, of dollars through western bank accounts. Obtaining
a clear picture of the possibly criminal activities linked to this money requires the close cooperation of
authorities from Russia, other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and many other countries.
Such cooperation is extremely difficult to obtain in a timely manner, particularly when many different countries
are involved. As a result, it is often impossible to investigate these cases as thoroughly as they deserve, and the
criminals gain the ability to hide and make use of their ill-gotten assets in the west.").
109 Cole, supra note 95, in 2012 WL 9246465.
110 United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1991).
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III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAWS GENERALLY
Extraterritorial application of RICO fits into the larger framework of the Supreme
Court's extraterritorial jurisprudence; thus, a brief discussion of the state of this area of law is
in order. Courts recognize "that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the
world," ' and generally assume Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. 112
Consequently, while Congress has authority to legislate beyond America's territorial
boundaries, whether or not it has exercised this authority is a matter of statutory
construction.11 3 Absent an apparent contrary intent, courts presume legislation is meant only
to apply within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 114 These premises are
undergirded by the assumption that Congress has the unique facilities necessary to make
important policy decisions in light of the possibilities for international discord and
retribution.1 1 5 By restraining courts from improperly interfering in potentially delicate aspects
of international relations, this cautious approach "serves to protect against unintended clashes
116
between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord."
Various tests developed by the lower courts to implement these simple principles
have not always been faithful to them. Prior to the Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Morrison (which was followed by Kiobel), courts applied variations or hybrids of the Second
Circuit's "conduct test" or "effects test," both of which were fashioned to help them wrangle
with extraterritorial Securities Exchange Act claims, to evaluate the extraterritoriality of
statutes deemed silent on the issue. 117 Under the conduct test, RICO would apply
extraterritorially "if conduct material to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the
United States. ""'8 Under the effects test, it would apply extraterritorially "if significant effects
of the racketeering are felt" in the United States.1 9
1 20
Because several courts have concluded RICO is silent as to its extraterritoriality,
and, presumptively, does not apply extraterritorially,1 21 new criteria became necessary for

. Microsoft v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
112 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
113

Id.

114 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
115
116

Benz v. Compania, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at 248.

117 See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, 566 F.3d 1095, 1130-31

(D.C. Cir. 2009); Liquidation
Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Alvarez Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The
more widely accepted view, and the one we adopt today, is that RICO may apply extraterritorially if conduct
material to the completion of the racketeering occurs in the United States, or if significant effects of the
racketeering are felt here."); John Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 961 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We agree with the
Second Circuit that for RICO to apply extraterritorially, the claim must meet either the 'conduct' or the 'effect'
test that courts have developed to determine jurisdiction in securities fraud cases.").
118 Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental,530 F.3d at 1351-52 (citing N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki,
100 F.3d 1046, 1051-53 (2d Cir. 1996) and Poulos v. Caesars World, 379 F.3d 654, 663-664 (9th Cir. 2004)).
119 Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2013); Norex Petroleum v. Access
Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010).
121 Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 974-75 ("Therefore, we begin the present analysis with a presumption that
120

RICO does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or criminal context"); In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments
Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("RICO does not apply extraterritorially.").
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RICO cases when the Supreme Court abolished the "conduct" and "effects" tests.' 22 Morrison
and its progeny, including Kiobel, have created uncertainty for courts seeking to apply RICO
extraterritorially. 123 In charting a way forward for the extraterritorial application of RICO,
then, one must consider Morrison and Kiobel and their general impact on the landscape of
extraterritorial jurisprudence.
A. Morrison
The Supreme Court substantially clarified the opaque extraterritorial landscape in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd. 124 The Court was challenged with determining
"whether § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities
traded on foreign exchanges." 125 Ultimately, it reaffirmed the presumption against
extraterritorial application of American laws. 126
In Morrison, National Australia Bank Limited, the largest bank in Australia, had
purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc., a mortgage servicer headquartered in Florida. While the
bank's shares were not listed on the New York Stock Exchange, its American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs), which are derivatives of the underlying shares representing the right to
receive a number of its shares traded on certain foreign exchanges, were listed. 127
According to the complaint, certain executives at HomeSide manipulated the
company's financial models, which inflated the trade value of National's ADRs, with the
knowledge of both companies' chief executive officers.128 Certain Australians who purchased
National's ADRs suffered financial losses when the fraud was exposed and subsequently sued
the companies and several executives for claims including alleged violations of § 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.129 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's
dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction.130
In rejecting the various tests adopted by the several Circuit Courts of Appeals for
ascertaining the extraterritorial application of federal statutes, Justice Scalia tersely distilled
the Court's canon of construction regarding extraterritorial application thusly: "When a
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none. 1 31 Further, he
122 Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 974-75 ("Therefore, we begin the present analysis with a presumption that RICO

does not apply extraterritorially in a civil or criminal context."); United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir.
2013) ("In sum, the general rule is that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to criminal statutes,
and Section 10(b) is no exception"); In re Toyota Motor, 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("The
analysis of RICO's extraterritorial application begins with the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison ... ");
United States v. Philip Morris USA, 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27-28 (D.D.C. 2011) ("[T]he Supreme Court intended
the presumption against extraterritoriality to apply to all statutes, not simply the Exchange Act ....
Therefore,
the Court concludes that the ruling in Morrison must be applied to RICO") (emphasis in original).
123 Huntley, supra note 5.
'24 See generally Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
125

Id. at 250-51.

126

Id.

127

Id.at 251.

121

Id. at 252.

129

id.

130 Id. at 253.
"3'

Id. at 255.
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explained that applying the presumption against extraterritoriality in all cases 1preserves
"a
32
stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.
The Court ultimately decided that none of the securities at issue were of the ilk §
10(b) was designed to regulate and punish because they were not on any American stock
exchange and all aspects of the ADR purchases occurred outside the United States. 33 Hence,
the purchases were not within the "focus" of congressional concern. 134While noting that
context can be consulted and a statute need not explicitly state that it applies abroad, the Court
concluded that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply extraterritorially because there is
no affirmative indication to the contrary.135
In Morrison, the Court effectively promulgated a two-part test for divining the
extraterritorial reach, if any, of federal statutes. First, absent a clear indication to the contrary,
a statute has no extraterritorial application. The validity of this presumption is seemingly
bolstered by the activity of Congress, which explicitly creates certain laws to apply
extraterritorially and amends others to add extraterritorial reach. This suggests that the
absence of extraterritorial language in particular statutes is intentional and significant. 136
Second, regarding domestic conduct, the decision limits a statute's application to those
domestic activities within the "focus" of congressional concern.137 In 2013, three years later,
the Court demonstrated in Kiobel that the Morrison test will control its extraterritorial
inquiries for the foreseeable future.
B. Kiobel
38

The Court affirmed the Morrison holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co.1
There, a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the United States sued Royal Dutch
Petroleum Company, and Shell Transport and Trading Company, two holding companies
incorporated in the Netherlands and England, respectively, as well as their joint subsidiary
incorporated in Nigeria. Following protests by residents in the Ogoniland area where the
subsidiary company engaged in oil exploration and production, Nigerian military and police
forces beat, raped, killed, and arrested villagers. 139 The plaintiffs, former residents of
Ogoniland, brought a federal suit alleging the companies had aided and abetted violations of
the Alien Tort Statute ["ATS"] by the Nigerian government. 40The Second Circuit dismissed
the complaint. However, after granting certiorari,the Supreme Court considered whether,
and under what circumstances, a court can recognize a claim under the ATS for violations of
the law of nations occurring within the territory of a foreign sovereign. 42

132

Id. at 261.

Id. at 266-67.
134Id. at 266-67, 273.
135Id. at 265.
136Walsh, supra note 2, at 662.
137 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 695-696 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
'33

13'Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
139 Id. at 1662-63.
141 Id. at 1662.
141 Id. at 1663.
142 Id. at 1662-64.
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The Court addressed each of the two prongs of the Morrison test. First, it discussed
the text of the statute and the historical background against which it was enacted.143 Following
this survey, the Court concluded, "the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS" and "nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption."1 44 In the opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that "nothing in the text of the statute suggests that Congress intended
causes of action recognized under it to have extraterritorial reach," 145 and "there is no
indication that the ATS was passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for
the enforcement of international norms. ' 46 All of the relevant conduct occurred in Nigeria, so
no extensive analysis regarding Morrison's second prong, i.e., whether domestic activities fell
within the "focus" of congressional concern, was necessary.147
In Morrison and Kiobel, the Supreme Court intended to give lower courts the clarity
needed to properly and consistently apply federal statutes extraterritorially. Unfortunately,
confusion still abounds. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals politely observed, "[d]espite
the supposed bright-line nature of Morrison's holding, there has been no shortage of
questions raised in its wake." 14 8 Others have been less diplomatic: "The Supreme Court's
recent extraterritoriality jurisprudence has been a mess." 149 This state of uncertainty is
particularly distressing because it hampers the full and effective employment of the RICO
statute in protecting American interests against transnational threats by potentially truncating
its great breadth.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND RICO
Lower courts have been struggling to apply RICO extraterritorially in the absence of
further guidance from the Supreme Court, and their efforts have produced a sharp split
regarding how its reach should be discerned. The difficulty stems largely from disparate
conceptions regarding the "focus" of congressional concern in enacting the statute. Some
writers have concluded that RICO has two 1 50 or even three foci. 151 Courts have divided into
two camps, though; one emphasizing the enterprise and the other emphasizing the pattern.152

141Id. at 1665-69.
'44Id. at 1669.
145Id. at 1665.
146 Id. at 1668.
147Id. at 1669.

141United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2013).
149William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against ExtraterritorialityAfter Morrison, 105 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
396, 396 (2001).
150See, e.g., Huntley, supra note 5, at 1704.
151See, e.g., Mark, supra note 4, at 594-99.
152United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 975 (91h Cir. 2013) ("The inquiry into RICO's focus is far
from clear-cut .... Courts that have addressed the issue fall essentially into two camps."); Hourani v. Mirtchev,
943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) ("Courts have disagreed somewhat on how to assess the
extraterritoriality of a RICO claim, falling generally into two camps."); Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 920 F.
Supp. 2d 517, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that district judges in the Second circuit have not reached
agreement on the issue of whether RICO's focus is the enterprise or the pattern of racketeering while analyzing
the case under both approaches); Borich v. BP, P.L.C., 904 F. Supp 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (When
applying Morrisonto RICO, courts have divided on the question of what part of RICO is the appropriate
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A. The "Enterprise Focus" Approach
Several district courts have muddled RICO's extraterritorial waters by mistakenly
concluding that congressional focus in enacting the statute was on the enterprise.153 As an
initial matter, this blatantly contradicts the Supreme Court's guidance regarding the statute's
focus.
Moreover, it has already proven unsatisfactory in practice. First, multiple courts have
acknowledged the inherent difficulties in applying this erroneous determination in the context
of an extraterritorial inquiry for RICO.155 Because RICO enterprises may exist simultaneously
in several nations, it is not surprising that courts have already begun developing and
employing different tests to determine where enterprises are located for purposes of the
extraterritorial inquiry. 156 The resulting variances undermine
predictability which, is "an
1
important value of the presumption against extraterritoriality."
Second, the approach that follows from the conclusion that RICO's focus is on the
enterprise can produce "absurd results." 1S Hypothetically, if officials of two companies
focus); In re Toyota Motor, 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914-15 (C.D. Cal. 2011) ("It is unclear how Morrison'slogic,
which evaluates the 'focus' of the relevant statute, precisely translates to RICO.").
153 See, e.g., Mitsui O.S.K. Lines. v. Seamaster Logistics, 871
F. Supp. 2d 933, 938 (N.D. Cal.
2012) ("[B]ecause RICO applies only to domestic enterprises, courts will be called upon to determine whether
a particular RICO enterprise, whatever its structure, is extraterritorial or domestic, which implies a rough
determination of the location of the enterprise. The enterprise's location need not be targeted with pinpoint
accuracy: The relevant question is simply whether the enterprise is extraterritorial or not."); In re LIBOR-Based
Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[W]e conclude that Congress's
focus in enacting RICO was the enterprise."); In re Le-Nature's, Inc. v. Krones, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56682 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011) (I]nthe case of RICO, the enterprise is clearly an object of
Congressional solicitude."); Cedefio v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]he focus of
RICO is on the enterprise as the recipient of, or cover for, a pattern of criminal activity .... RICO does not
apply where, as here, the alleged enterprise and the impact of the predicate activity upon it are entirely
foreign.").
154H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989); Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483
U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
155United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Determining the geographic location of
an enterprise whether foreign or domestic is a difficult inquiry, however."); Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, 871 F.
Supp. 2d at 938 ("The challenge of applying Morrison in RICO cases stems from the difficulty of ascertaining
where a RICO enterprise is located.").
156Compare Mitsui O.S.K.Lines, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 940 ("The nerve center test provides
a familiar, consistent,
and administrable method for determining the territoriality of RICO enterprises in cases such as the one at bar,
which blend domestic and foreign elements."), and European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 02-CV-5771, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23538 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011) ("Applying the nerve center test here, to determine an
"enterprise's" location, similarly avoids the "weigh[ing of] corporate functions, assets, or revenues different in
kind, one from the other." Hertz, 130 S.Ct. at 1194. An analysis of the territoriality of an "enterprise" in a
RICO complaint, therefore, should focus on the decisions effectuating the relationships and common interest of
its members, and how those decisions are made."); with In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig.,
935 F. Supp. 2d 666, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("In locating the enterprise, the nerve center test, despite its
usefulness in other cases, has little value here. The decision making of the alleged enterprise likely occurred in
several different countries, and might even have been located in each of the countries in which a defendant was
headquartered .... Therefore, because the decision making in furtherance of the alleged scheme would likely
have occurred in many countries, the 'nerve center' test does not point us to a single location. Given that the
location of the enterprise's 'brain' is indeterminate, we will consider the location of the enterprise's 'brawn,' or
where the enterprise acted.").
157 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593 (2d Cir. Apr.
23, 2014).
151 Chevron v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
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engaging in substantial business in the United States, one domestic and one foreign, both
conducted the affairs of their respective entities through a pattern of racketeering, officials of
the former would be subject to RICO's criminal and civil sanctions while employees and
associates of the latter would be immune. 159 In seizing upon this logical and necessary result
of the "enterprise focus" approach, members of the defense bar have already begun
advocating this ludicrous result in order to protect foreign clients without regard to the extent
of their domestic dealings. 160 Such a construction would clearly frustrate the statute's
purpose.
Third, even proponents of the approach have admitted that it largely neuters the
RICO statute's prowess in redressing significant threats from international and transnational
actors to America's vital security and economic interests.1 62 This is wholly untenable because,
for example, the Mexican drug cartel leader that exports drugs into the United States and
orders kidnappings and murders on American soil to expedite payment from American buyers
would be exempt from prosecution under RICO because his enterprise is foreign, even though
he is clearly breaking domestic laws and endangering American citizens.163 Such a conclusion
only exacerbates America's vulnerability to extraterritorial attacks of various kinds.164 The

151Id. at 243.
160

Hargrove, et al., supra note 6, at 55 ("If the alleged enterprise is primarily foreign, then a defendant should

make a motion to dismiss the RICO claim.").
161 See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) ("[W]e
find no indication that Congress intended to limit Title IX to infiltration of domestic enterprises. On the
contrary, the salutary purposes of the Act would be frustrated by such construction. It would permit those
whose actions ravage the American economy to escape prosecution simply by investing the proceeds of their
ill-gotten gains in a foreign enterprise. We reject any such construction."); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. 1506, 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("The Act thus permits no inference that it was intended to apply only to
conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO's purpose by allowing
persons engaged in racketeering activities directed at the United States to escape RICO's bite simply by moving
their operations abroad. Yet in the context of narcotics activities, perhaps the greatest threat to this country's
welfare comes from enterprises outside the United States such as the Columbian cocaine cartels."); see also
Chevron 871 F. Supp. 2d 229 ("From a practical perspective, it is well to bear in mind that foreign enterprises
have been at the heart of precisely the sortof activities
committed in the United States
that were exactly
what Congress enacted RICO to eradicate.").
162 Huntley, supra note 5, at 1715 ("Additionally, the enterprise approach leaves the statute with
no, or almost
no, extraterritorial application, which is in keeping with the presumption against extraterritoriality and
Congress's presumed focus on domestic affairs.").
163 Cf. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2014)
("Second, the district court's requirement that the defendant be, loosely speaking, associated with a domestic
enterprise in order to sustain RICO liability seems to us illogical. Under that standard, if an enterprise formed in
another nation sent emissaries to the United States to engage in domestic murders, kidnappings, and violations
of the various RICO predicate statutes, its participants would be immune from RICO liability merely because
the crimes committed in the United States were done in conjunction with a foreign enterprise. Surely the
presumption against extraterritorial application of United States laws does not command giving foreigners carte
blanche to violate the laws of the United States in the United States.").
164Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1517 (stating that RICO "permits no inference that it was intended to apply only to
conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO's purpose by allowing
persons engaged in racketeering activities directed at the United States to escape RICO's bite simply by moving
their operations abroad. Yet in the context of narcotics activities, perhaps the greatest threat to this country's
welfare comes from enterprises outside the United States such as the Columbian cocaine cartels."); Mark, supra
note 4, at 545.
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current geopolitical climate demands a fierce resistance to such excessive restraint,
which will
1
be the natural result of carrying the presumption against extraterritoriality too far. 65
B. The "Pattern Focus" Approach
The alternative and better approach, adopted by most courts that have confronted the
issue of RICO's focus post-Morrison, recognizes that the pattern of racketeering is its
focus. 166 The Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded, "RICO's statutory language and
legislative history support the notion that RICO's focus is on the pattern of racketeering
activity."1 67 This determination is consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-Morrison dicta on
the matter.1 8 While the courts adopting this approach have properly identified the statute's
focus, their applications have drawn legitimate criticisms. Some have noted that these courts
seem to improperly apply the "conduct" and "effects" tests expressly rejected in Morrison.169
This is a valid criticism where these courts continue focusing on the locus of the predicate
acts. The "pattern focus," then, is a step in the right direction, but careful, precise application
is needed.
To date, only two Circuit Courts have squarely confronted the matter of RICO's
extraterritorial reach since Morrison, and both concluded that RICO's focus is upon the
pattern of racketeering. Perhaps this suggests some minimal degree of clarity is developing.
Notably, the underlying facts in each case are emblematic of the new and emerging dangers in
increasingly globalized societies and illustrate the grave necessity of resolving this issue. Both

165 Walsh, supra note 2, at 651 ("While extraterritorial interpretation may abuse the intended confines of a
statute, strictly applying the presumption can have a severely limiting effect and may result in excessive
restraint.").

166Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding, "in accordance with the majority of
other post-Morrison cases deciding this issue," that " RICO's focus is on the pattern of racketeering activity);
Borich v. BP, P.L.C., 904 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2012) ("That conclusion [that, in determining whether
a plaintiff seeks extraterritorial application of RICO, the focus is on whether the enterprise is extraterritorial]
has some appeal, but this Court is persuaded by the courts that have concluded that the proper focus is the
pattern of racketeering activity and its consequences.").
167 United States v. Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir. 2013).
16' Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987); H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989).
169See, e.g., Norex Petroleum v. Access Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (dismissing a RICO claim
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), in part, because, "[t]he slim contacts with the United States alleged by Norex are
insufficient to support extraterritorial application of the RICO statute," even though the plaintiff alleged that
defendants committed numerous racketeering acts in the United States); Cedefio v. Intech Grp., 733 F. Supp. 2d
471, 473-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing an Amended Complaint with prejudice despite plaintiffs'
"superficial argument" that a RICO should apply extraterritorially to the extent that the alleged predicate acts
applied extraterritorially because "RICO does not apply where ... the alleged enterprise and the impact of the
predicate activity upon it are entirely foreign"); United States v. Philip Morris USA, 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29
(D.D.C. 2011) ("[I]solated domestic conduct does not permit RICO to apply to what is essentially foreign
activity."); Aluminum Bahr. B.S.C. v. Alcoa Inc., Civ. Action No. 8-299, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80478 (W.D.
Pa. Jun. 11, 2012) ("To the extent that one considers the district court's opinion, Norex v. Access Industries,
540 F. Supp.2d 438 (S.D. N.Y. 2007), the court engaged in a 'conducts' test
the test rejected by the Supreme
Court in Morrison and by me in In re Le-Nature's Inc., Civ. No. 9-1445, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56682, 2011
WL 211533 at * 2 n. 5 (W.D. Pa. May 26, 2011)"); Hargrove, et al., supra note 6, at 53; Huntley, supra note 5,
at 1711.
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17
17 0
of the cases, United States v. Chao Fan Xu and European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
will be briefly evaluated here for their value to other courts that will grapple with this issue in
the future.

1.

1

Chao FanXu

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted the question of RICO's reach in a
multinational context in United States v. Chao Fan Xu. 17 2 The court took a step in the right
direction by assessing RICO's applicability to the defendants' conduct in a graduated rather
than wholesale fashion. Still, the Ninth Circuit did not go far enough; by focusing on the
locus of the conduct rather than the language of the underlying predicates, its rationale is
properly subject to the same criticisms levied against courts that rejected the "pattern focus"
approach in favor of the "enterprise focus" approach. 173
In Chao Fan Xu, four defendants, all Chinese nationals, utilized the tools of the
global economy to defraud the Bank of China out of hundreds of millions of dollars; transfer
the stolen funds out of China; flee to the United States via immigration fraud; and spend the
funds in, among other places, Las Vegas casinos. 174Consistent with its emphasis on
geography, the Court of Appeals determined that the international enterprise had two parts,
with one consisting of "racketeering activities conducted predominantly in China" and the
other consisting of "racketeering activities in the United States."
This is unfortunate
language in that it improperly conflates the "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering"
elements. However, it is significant that the court bifurcated the conduct in anticipation of
treating the domestic and foreign conduct distinctly, which other courts had failed to do.
Regarding the fraud perpetrated in China against the Bank of China, the court
concluded, "to the extent it was predicated on extraterritorial activity, it is beyond the reach of
RICO even if the bank fraud resulted in some of the money reaching the United States. 1 76
The conduct within the territorial United States, however, including violation of America's
immigration laws, was deemed properly subject to the government's RICO charges. 1 In
rejecting the argument that RICO did not apply under the circumstances because of the
extraterritorial nature of the enterprise and some of its activities, the Ninth Circuit reasoned,
"Given this express legislative intent to punish patterns of organized criminal activity in the
United States, it is highly unlikely that Congress was unconcerned with the actions of foreign
enterprises where those actions violated the laws of this country while the defendants were in
this country." 178 The court went on to affirm the defendants' RICO convictions "because the
convictions are not based on an improper extraterritorial application of RICO, but rather are

10

See generally Chao Fan Xu,706 F.3d 965.

171 See generally European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593 (2d Cir. Apr.

23, 2014).
172 Chao FanXu, 706 F.3d at 965.
173 Cf. Doe v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 115 (D.D.C. 2005) ("The nationality of the criminal
enterprise or the locus of the racketeering activity alone, then, should not limit RICO's grasp.").
'74

Chao FanXu, 706 F.3d at 974.

175Id. at 978.
176 Id.

177Id.
178Id.
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based on a pattern of racketeering activities that were conducted by the Defendants in the
territorial United States."' 1 79 Apparently, no analysis of the predicate statutes was deemed
necessary.
The court's decision in Chao Fan Xu broke with the approach of the various district
courts that had considered RICO's extraterritorial reach post-Morrison because it did not treat
the matter as an "all or nothing" proposition.180 This at least allowed redress of conduct that
occurred in the United States and potentially avoided the gross inequity of allowing foreign
nationals in the United States to violate American law with impunity. The incongruity of its
approach is obvious, however; the Court rejected the alleged money laundering predicates
because they were "predicated on extraterritorial conduct," yet upheld stand-alone convictions
for the very same conduct.1 81
While the Ninth Circuit's recognition of the need to treat RICO predicates distinctly
in assessing the statute's extraterritorial reach is good, the court did not actually apply RICO
extraterritorially at all because the pattern it recognized was winnowed to wholly domestic
conduct. 182 This failed to answer the "hard" question of the extent to which the statute
actually applies extraterritorially. The risk inherent in this approach is evinced by the court's
incongruous treatment of the defendants' money laundering conduct; in certain instances, the
approach will not give full effect to the reach of the underlying predicates. While Chao Fan
Xu constitutes a step in the right direction, the Second Circuit's approach in European Cmty.
v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., decided approximately one year later, goes further and avoids the risk of
incongruity by recognizing that RICO's extraterritorial reach must ..
be1 coextensive
with that of
183
the predicates comprising the pattern of racketeering in a particular case.
2.

European Community

After several years of turmoil, the Second Circuit finally arrived at a logical,
workable approach to RICO's extraterritorial application that neither unduly neuters nor
expands the statute. Having previously declined to squarely address the issue,18 4 the Second
171 Id. at 979.

"' Id. at 975 ("Indeed, Defendants were charged here with membership in a criminal enterprise that involved
not only embezzlement against the Bank of China that occurred in China and Hong Kong (part one) but also
immigration fraud to escape to the United States with their ill-gotten gains (part two). Accordingly, we must

determine whether under the circumstances of this case RICO can be lawfully applied to any, or all, of
Defendants' conduct foreign or domestic.").
...
Id. at 978-82.
112Id. at 979 ("We affirm Defendants' count one convictions because the convictions are not based on an
improper extraterritorial application of RICO, but rather are based on a pattern of racketeering activities that
were conducted by the Defendants in the territorial United States."); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S.
349, 371 (2005) ("Finally, our interpretation of the wire fraud statute does not give it 'extraterritorial effect.'

Petitioners used U. S. interstate wires to execute a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax revenue. Their
offense was complete the moment they executed the scheme inside the United States.") (internal citations
omitted); United States v. Coffman, No. 12-5574, 2014 WL 3673028 (6th Cir. July 22, 2014) ("We do not need

to decide the reach of the Morrisonpresumption because defendants' domestic conduct falls within the ambit of
each of the statutes"); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he presumption

against extraterritoriality is not applicable when the conduct regulated by the government occurs within the
United States.").
183 European
184 See

Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593(2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2014).
Norex Petroleum v. Access Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010).
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Circuit finally confronted the question of RICO's extraterritorial reach for the first time after
Morrison in European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.185 It concluded, "We think it far more
reasonable to make the extraterritorial application of 86RICO coextensive with the
extraterritorial application of the relevant predicate statutes.",
The underlying complaint alleged conduct that is becoming more and more typical
in our increasingly globalized society and is representative of the complex transnational
dangers we now face. The Court described it thusly:
According to the Complaint, the scheme alleged to violate RICO involves a multistep process beginning with the smuggling of illegal narcotics into Europe by Colombian and
Russian criminal organizations. The drugs are sold, producing revenue in euros, which the
criminal organizations "launder" by using money brokers in Europe to exchange the euros for
the domestic currency of the criminal organizations' home countries. The money brokers then
sell the euros to cigarette importers at a discounted rate. The cigarette importers use these
euros to purchase RJR's cigarettes from wholesalers or "cut-outs." The wholesalers then
purchase the cigarettes from RJR and ship the cigarettes to the importers who purchased
them. And the money brokers use the funds derived from the cigarette importers to continue
87
the laundering cycle.1
RJR was alleged to have "laundered money through New York-based financial
institutions and repatriated the profits of the scheme to the United States." ' In order to
facilitate the scheme, the company's executives and employees traveled from the United
States to Europe, the Caribbean, and Central America; shipped cigarettes through Panama in
order to use Panama's secrecy laws to shield the transactions from government scrutiny; took
monthly trips from the United States to Colombia through Venezuela while bribing border
guards in order to enter Colombia illegally; and communicated internally and with
coconspirators by means of U.S. interstate and international mail and wires. 89
The district court dismissed the RICO claims, but the Second Circuit, noting that
"RICO does not qualify the geographic scope of the enterprise,"1 90 rejected the lower court's
analysis and vacated the dismissal.1 91 In so doing, the Court of Appeals bifurcated its inquiry
into the defendants' activities, but it did so based on the actual language of the predicates
rather than their location as the Ninth Circuit did in Chao Fan Xu. RICO liability consisting
of a pattern of domestic offenses, as well as extraterritorial money laundering and terrorism
violations, then, was potentially viable. 92
Significantly, the Court of Appeals conducted a more careful analysis regarding the
indicia of Congressional intentions regarding RICO's extraterritorial application than other
courts that have considered the question. Consequently, its investigation more fully respected
the statute's unique construction, and it avoided the extremes that have plagued most
discussions on the matter. On the one hand, the Second Circuit flatly rejected the district
court's conclusion that RICO cannot apply to a foreign enterprise or to extraterritorial
185European Cmty., No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593.
186

Id.

187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192

Id.
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conduct.1 93 On the other, it discounted the overzealous contention of some that RICO should
be applied extraterritorially in a wholesale fashion simply because some of its predicates
apply extraterritorially. 194 According to the court, "Congress manifested an unmistakable
intent that certain of the federal statutes adopted as predicates for RICO liability apply to
extraterritorial conduct."' 195 It concluded:
RICO applies extraterritorially if, and only if, liability or guilt could attach to
extraterritorial conduct under the relevant RICO predicate. Thus, when a RICO claim depends
on violations of a predicate statute that manifests an unmistakable congressional intent to
apply extraterritorially, RICO will apply to extraterritorial conduct, too, but only to the extent
that the predicate would. Conversely, when a RICO claim depends on violations of a
predicate statute that does not overcome Morrison's presumption against extraterritoriality,
RICO will not apply extraterritorially either. 196
The Second Circuit's conclusion was compelled, first and foremost, by the text of
the RICO statute, the examination of which is the first step required by Morrison. It noted that
§ 1961(1), which defines "racketeering activity" for purposes of RICO, incorporates by
reference various federal criminal statutes that "unambiguously and necessarily involve
extraterritorial conduct." ' 197 None of the courts that have concluded that RICO is silent as to
its extraterritoriality, including the Second Circuit a few years earlier,19 8 squarely confronted
this plain reality. Yet, "it is hard to imagine why Congress would incorporate these statutes as
RICO predicates if RICO could never have extraterritorial application." 199Further, other
statutes incorporated as RICO predicates clearly apply to both domestic and extraterritorial
conduct.20
The Second Circuit's "coextensive with the predicate acts" framework in European
Cmty. provides a straightforward, predictable approach to assessing RICO's extraterritorial
reach that is faithful to the text and intent of the statute. Notably, the court declined to decide
precisely how to distinguish between domestic and extraterritorial application of several
individual statutes. This will obviously be an area of contention in future cases where this
approach is utilized since the reach of the predicates will necessarily determine RICO's reach.

193

Id.
194 See, e.g., id. (acknowledging that litigants have argued that RICO's reference to foreign commerce
sufficiently indicates congressional intent that RICO should apply extraterritorially); United States v. Philip
Morris USA, 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2011) ("The Government argues that because some of the
predicate acts which may give rise to a 'racketeering activity' prohibited by RICO are extraterritorial in nature
Congress must have assumed that RICO would have extraterritorial scope in general"); Norex Petroleum v.
Access Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Morrison similarly forecloses Norex's argument that because a
number of RICO's predicate acts possess an extraterritorial reach, RICO itself possesses an extraterritorial
reach.").
195 European Cmty., No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593.
196 Id.
197 Id.

19' Norex Petroleum, 631 F.3d at 32-33.
199European Cmty., No. 11 C 5812, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593.
200 Id.
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V. BONA FIDES OF THE "COEXTENSIVE WITH PREDICATE ACTS"
APPROACH
Given the state of utter confusion regarding RICO's extraterritorial reach and the
significant interests at stake, the Supreme Court will inevitably need to squarely confront and
decisively settle the question. When it does, it should adopt the framework from European
Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc. The "coextensive with predicate acts" approach was suggested
previously,201 but it has never gained significant traction in the courts. It is necessary, then, to
explain why it is the best way forward in the current climate and articulate the merits for its
widespread adoption.
A.

This Approach Fully Respects the Statute's Text

First and foremost, this approach respects the text of the statute as Congress wrote it
and keeps the courts in their proper lane. In short, "Congress made RICO extraterritorial
when it adopted predicate acts with extraterritorial application. 2 2 As the Supreme Court
noted in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., it has "repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing
constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress
intended to proscribe. 2 3 The same caution is appropriate in determining how to apply the
statute extraterritorially. After all, "the fact that RICO has been applied in situations not
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates
breadth. 20 4
Second, whatever the precise scope of congressional concern in enacting the statute,
it did not limit the geographic scope of the term "enterprise"; rather, it chose language broad
enough to encompass foreign enterprises and foreign conduct, at least insofar as the
incorporated statutes encompass them. 0 Neither did it limit the geographic scope of the term
"pattern of racketeering." Congress certainly could have expressly limited RICO to domestic
application, but it did not do so. To the contrary, it chose language that rather clearly
encompasses transnational affairs. The reference to "foreign commerce," for example, is not

201 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL

RICO: 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968 (A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS) 291-92 (5th ed. 2009) ("[I]t is clear that
criminal RICO applies extraterritorially where the alleged racketeering offenses apply extraterritorially");
Stephen C. Warneck, A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the FinancialStrength of
InternationalTerrorist Organizations, 78 B.U. L. REV. 177, 200 (1998) ("Because RICO prescribes criminal
penalties for a defendant who has committed two or more acts constituting a 'pattern of racketeering activity,' a
successful RICO conviction depends upon establishment of the behavior that constitutes the underlying
predicate criminal offenses. Because of this special characteristic of a RICO conviction, it appears that RICO
can apply extraterritorially only if the statutes defining the relevant predicate offenses also have an
extraterritorial reach.").
202 Daniel Hoppe, Racketeering After Morrison: ExtraterritorialApplication of Civil RICO, 107 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1375, 1395 (2013).
203 Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 660 (2008).
204 Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
205 See United States v. Lee Stoller Enter., 652 F.2d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The word 'any', here [in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4)] used three times, has a comprehensive meaning of 'all or every.' This language is strong and
plain.... The statute is so broad that it applies to foreign enterprises as well as to domestic ones and to small
enterprises as well as to large ones.") (internal citations omitted).
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dispositive but it is not insignificant either. There is no reason to assume this broad language
was employed haphazardly. In fact,
there is good reason to believe the converse is true,20 6 and
0
deference.
that deserves judicial
Failure to give extraterritorial force to statutes incorporated into RICO that
expressly state they only apply extraterritorially would constitute a direct rejection of
Congress' power to legislate extraterritorially. 208 Their inclusion would be inexplicable
surplusage if they cannot reach extraterritorial conduct as predicates in a RICO charge or
claim. Similarly, failure to fully recognize the extraterritorial reach of predicates that clearly
state they can be applied both domestically and extraterritorially amounts to a partial rejection
of Congressional authority to legislate beyond America's territorial boundaries. It is not
appropriate for the judiciary to limit legitimate causes of action or bases for prosecution
written into federal statutes, even if they are applied in seemingly unanticipated
circumstances.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512(h), for instance, plainly prescribes extraterritorial application
for offenses involving tampering with witnesses, victims, and informants. 209 Consequently, a
drug dealer in the United States would be culpable under the statute for murdering a potential
witness against him even if the witness were domiciled in a foreign country. 2 Also, a
business executive in the United Kingdom who induced others to destroy documents in
Europe with the intention of impairing their use and availability in an official proceeding in
the United States would also be culpable. 211
There is no reasonable basis for contending that Congress intended to curb § 1512's
reach one whit when it was imported as a RICO predicate. 212 The converse, i.e., that Congress
incorporated § 1512 precisely because of its reach, and fully intended it to have the same
scope it enjoyed as a stand-alone offense when employed as a RICO predicate, is far more
plausible and almost certainly true. The same can be said for many other predicates that
clearly apply extraterritorially and are essential to protecting American interests against new

...See United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 (2d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (finding
no indication that Congress intended § 1962(b) to focus exclusively on the enterprise acquired and sought to
protect only American institutions and stating, "On the contrary, its legislative history leaves no room for doubt
that Congress intended to deal generally with the influences of organized crime on the American economy and
not merely with its infiltration into domestic enterprises.").
207 Cf Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 372 (2005) ("It may seem an odd use of the Federal
Government's resources to prosecute a U. S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada. But the broad
language of the wire fraud statute authorizes it to do so, and no canon of statutory construction permits us to
read the statute more narrowly.").
208 European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, No. 11-2475-cv, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7593 (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 2014)
("By incorporating these statutes into RICO as predicate racketeering acts, Congress has clearly communicated
its intention that RICO apply to extraterritorial conduct to the extent that extraterritorial violations of those
statutes serve as the basis for RICO liability."); Hoppe, supra note 202, at 1394 ("To construe RICO not to
apply to extraterritorial conduct would be to ignore the extraterritorial reach of some of the predicate acts in the
statute.").
209See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(h) (2012).
210See United States v. Fisher, 494 F.3d 5, 8-9 (1st Cit. 2007).

211See United States v. Norris, 753 F. Supp. 2d 492, 511 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
212See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B).
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and emerging transnational threats."' If a curb on the span of the RICO's
application is
214
needed, the remedy properly lies with Congress and not the federal courts.
B.

This Approach Is Consistent with Approaches to Similar Statutes

In the discussion of RICO's extraterritorial application in judicial and scholastic
circles to date, it seems that very few, if any, have carefully considered how courts have
determined the extraterritorial reach of other offenses predicated upon underlying substantive
violations. For example, it is generally presumed that ancillary statutes apply extraterritorially
where the underlying substantive statute has extraterritorial effect. 215 Title 18, U.S.C. § 3,
which criminalizes being an "accessoryS • after
216 the fact," applies extraterritorially if the
underlying offense applies extraterritorially. The same is true of federal conspiracy and
aiding and abetting offenses.21 Similarly, since Morrison, several courts, including three
Circuit Courts of Appeal, have concluded that 18 U.S.C.
924(c) applies extraterritorially
• • §218
insofar as the statute it incorporates applies extraterritorially.
Section 924(c) is a compound

213

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 959 (2012) (possession, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substance); Chua

Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012) (sex trafficking of
children or by force, fraud, or coercion); United States v. Strevell, 185 F. App'x 841, 844-45 (11th Cir. 2006);
18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2012) (transportation of minors); United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.
2011); 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2012) (prohibitions with respect to biological weapons); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2012)
(use of weapons of mass destruction); §18 U.S.C. § 2332f (2012) (bombings of places of public use,
government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities); United States v. Bodmer, 342
F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("If immunity from the FCPA's criminal penalties automatically
conferred non-resident foreign nationals with immunity from the money laundering statute, these non-resident
foreign nationals could openly serve as professional money launderers of proceeds derived from violations of
the FCPA, without repercussion. United States citizens and entities could hire non-resident foreign nationals to
launder money derived from FCPA violations, and the launderers would be beyond the reach of the Department
of Justice even if part of the conduct occurred in the United States. This would contravene Congress's clearly
articulated intention to include foreigners within the scope of the money laundering statute."); 18 U.S.C. § 1462
(2012) (importation of transportation of obscene matter).
214 Cf. Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 499-500 (1985) ("It is true that private civil actions under the statute are
being brought almost solely against such defendants, rather than against the archetypal, intimidating mobster.
16 Yet this defect -- if defect it is -- is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with
Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has provided it
simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more difficult applications.").
215 United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 814 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d
189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Reumayr, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1219 (D.N.M. 2008) ("Generally,
a statute ancillary to a substantive offense statute is presumed to have extraterritorial intent if the underlying
substantive offense statute is determined to have extraterritorial intent.").
216 U.S. v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1991).
217 Chua Han Mow v. U.S., 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.1984) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985) (noting that
"[t]his court ... has regularly inferred extraterritorial reach of conspiracy statutes on the basis of a finding that
the underlying substantive statutes reach extraterritorial offenses."); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673,
682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Extraterritorial jurisdiction over a conspiracy charge depends on whether extraterritorial
jurisdiction exists as to the underlying substantive crime."); United States v. Ali, 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23
(D.D.C. 2012) ("In addition, courts have concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not
apply to the federal statutes establishing aiding and abetting and conspiratorial liability where the statute setting
forth the underlying substantive offense applies outside U.S. borders.").
211 United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 246-47 (4th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) ("Finally,
§ 924(c), on which Count 6 is based, criminalizes the use or possession of a firearm in connection with a crime
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offense, like RICO, and proscribes the use of a firearm during a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking crime. These offenses are similar to RICO in that they incorporate other
substantive offenses, and this parallel warrants analogous treatment, which the Second
Circuit's "coextensive" framework affords.
C.

This Approach Maximizes Simplicity and Predictability

Courts should favor the coextensive approach because they generally prefer legal
tests and standards that maximize simplicity and predictability while minimizing confusion. 9
It has been argued that the enterprise approach creates clear lines and can produce predictable
results, 220 but approaches based on the geographical locus of the enterprise or the alleged
predicate acts require far more intensive and tedious factual determinations, particularly for
multinational groups and continuing offenses, that will tend to make outcomes less
predictable for the government and private actors.
As noted and discussed previously, these approaches also lead to troubling
incongruities. As such, it would be prudent for courts to adopt the "coextensive with predicate
acts" framework, which "has the benefit of simplifying the question of what conduct is
actionable in the United States and permitting courts to consistently analyze that question
regardless of whether they are presented with a RICO claim or a claim under the relevant
predicate. "221 This approach will help eliminate the discrepancies and disparities that presently
characterize judicial decisions in this area.
D.

This Approach Protects America's Citizenry and Economy

Frameworks that emphasize physical location actually encourage criminals to strike
America's citizens and economy with impunity from beyond its physical borders. This would
inevitably incentivize narcotics traffickers, cyber criminals and terrorists, among others, to
locate or remain outside of America's physical borders while inflicting tremendous damage

of violence. It is an ancillary crime that depends on the nature and reach of the underlying crime. Thus, its
jurisdictional reach is coextensive with the jurisdiction of the underlying crime."); United States v. Siddiqui,
699 F.3d 690, 701 (2d. Cir. 2012) ("As for § 924, which criminalizes the use of a firearm during commission of
a crime of violence, every federal court that has considered the issue has given the statute extraterritorial
application where, as here, the underlying substantive criminal statutes apply extraterritorially. We see no
reason to quarrel with their conclusions.") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783,
814 (11th Cir. 2010) (concluding that § 924(c) applies extraterritorially because "a statute ancillary to a
substantive offense statute is presumed to have extraterritorial effect if the underlying substantive offense
statute is determined to have extraterritorial effect") (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Ahmed, No. 10 Cr. 131, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2012) ("To the extent
that Morrison applies to ancillary criminal statutes like section 924(c), it supports extraterritorial application.
As has been discussed, section 924(c) explicitly applies "to any crime of violence ... for which the person may
be prosecuted in a Court of the United States."18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). And, it is settled that certain crimes of
violence committed abroad are punishable in United States courts. With this context, and with Morrison's
guidance that a statute need not speak in geographic terms to speak clearly, 130 S.Ct. at 2883, section 924(c)
manifests an intention of extraterritorial application.").
219 See, e.g., Hydro Res., v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1164 (10th Cit. 2010).
220 Huntley, supra note 5, at 1716.
221 Hoppe, supra note 202, at 1398.
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from afar,"' with full knowledge that sovereign borders protect them from America's courts.
The location of the enterprise, and even the racketeering acts themselves, should be material
only to the extent that it is relevant in determining the extraterritorial reach of the alleged
predicate offenses. To the extent that geography is legally material, then, it will be
considered, as it should be, in the analysis of the reach of the individual predicates under the
"coextensive with predicate acts" approach.
E. This Approach Minimizes the Potential for Abuse
Several courts have expressed concern that RICO is sometimes applied abusively.223
The availability of this tool can encourage overzealous charging decisions and civil suits. Of
course, this concern is not nearly so great in criminal cases because the Justice Department
offers a filter through which all RICO prosecutions must be screened. 224 Yet, there is no civil
screening equivalent, and this is sometimes a source of judicial consternation.
Coextensive
extraterritorial application of RICO should be inviting for courts because, in stark contrast to
arguments for indiscriminate extraterritorial application of RICO where some of the alleged

222

id.

223 AG of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 268 F.3d 103, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (J.Calabresi, dissenting)
("In this respect, I note my own discomfort with various aspects of RICO, and especially of civil RICO. I
would not be displeased if the Supreme Court, faced with the possible effects of civil RICO in a case like this
one, were to retreat from its insistence on an identical scope for civil and criminal RICO. Similarly, I would
welcome a reconsideration by Congress of how far civil RICO ought to go."); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948
F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) ("For another thing, in cases alleging civil RICO violations, particular care is
required to balance the liberality of the Civil Rules with the necessity of preventing abusive or vexatious
treatment of defendants."); Meier v. Musburger, 588 F.Supp.2d 883, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (internal citations
omitted) ("Even though Congress never intended that the statute be employed to allow plaintiffs to turn gardenvariety state law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cases into RICO claims, from the beginning, the breadth of
RICO's text and the lure of treble damages and attorneys' fees proved irresistible to those bent on federalizing
such claims.").
224Sedima v. Imrex, 473 U.S. 479, 503 (1985) (J.Marshall, dissenting); DelRio-Mocci
v. Connolly Props.,
672 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2012) ("In the criminal arena, this proclivity for abuse is at least limited
by prosecutorial discretion, the risk of losing credibility with jurors if the prosecution engages in "overkill" or
overreaching, and the related risk of jury nullification. However, RICO's civil remedy is not restricted by any
such considerations. Thus, it is not surprising that we are today faced with a claim that this landlord-tenant
dispute is really a racketeering conspiracy that should entitle this tenant to treble damages under RICO.");
Helios Int'l S.A.R.L. v. Cantamessa USA, 12 Civ. 8205, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69999 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
("[F]ederal courts are wary of allowing traditional copyright claims to form the basis of a civil RICO claim
unconstrained by the limits of prosecutorial discretion and higher standard of proof that accompany actual
government prosecutions under § 2319."); Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, 699 F. Supp. 368, 377 (D.R.I. 1988)
("[O]verbreadth is limited through prosecutorial discretion in cases brought by the government, but in private
actions a proper construction of the pattern requirement is all that constrains plaintiffs to obey Congressional
intent."); Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 591 F. Supp. 581, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("It is incumbent upon
courts, especially in civil RICO actions where the restraint ofprosecutorial discretion is not present, to
scrutinize claims to insure that the statute is not applied to contexts outside those intended by Congress."); DLJ
Mortg. Capital, Inc. v. Kontogiannis, 726 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[P]laintiffs have often been
overzealous in pursuing RICO claims, flooding federal courts by dressing up run-of-the-mill fraud claims as
RICO violations. In consequence, courts must 'strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage
of the litigation."').
225 id.
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racketeering acts apply extraterritorially, this approach creates no greater reach than that
already inherent in the crimes specifically incorporated by Congress.
Conclusion
Advocates and courts have historically adopted an unnecessarily dualistic approach
to the extraterritorial application of RICO. At one poll are those suggesting the statute
absolutely cannot be applied extraterritorially because it does not announce congressional
intention for such application. At the other, there are those suggesting that Congress has
manifested clear intention that the statute be applied extraterritorially in a wholesale fashion.
As is so often the case, neither extreme is merited, and the truth is in the middle.
The Second Circuit struck the proper balance and recognized both the length and the
limits for redressing extraterritorial conduct inherent in the RICO statute itself. Unless
Congress amends the language of the statute, the "coextensive with predicate acts" approach
is best for faithfully determining its extraterritorial reach on a case-by-case basis. It allows
potential plaintiffs and prosecutors the latitude Congress intended, based on the plain
language of the statute, while restraining them from going any further. As a practical matter,
it also permits prosecutors and plaintiffs to adequately confront the injurious behavior of
United States citizens, on the one hand, while protecting their interests, on the other.
If more is needed in light of present and developing transnational threats, Congress
should act decisively to broaden RICO's extraterritorial scope. Perhaps a legislative remedy is
needed. Perhaps one is coming. Unless and until it comes, though, the "coextensive with
predicate acts" approach propounded by the Second Circuit provides the clear, logical, and
just way forward in light of RICO's language and purpose. Moreover, it affords the statute the
amplitude Congress intended to meet the significant international threats it is uniquely
capable of redressing. It permits full, but not reckless, deployment of this "unusually potent
weapon ''226 at a time when improper and impractical restraint would be greatly detrimental to
America's vital interests.

116Miranda,948 F.2d at 44 (1st Cir. 1991).
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